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Abstract: In our paper we try to answer two empirical research questions. First, we assess the 
deliberative quality of discussions in two committees of the EU Parliament. In order to do so, 
we use a slightly revised version of the DQI. Second, we identify and empirically measure those 
variables that systematically influence the quality of deliberation in interviews with debate actors. 
We argue that the quality of deliberation in EU committees is influenced by two normative values: 
deliberation (common good orientation) and responsiveness (particular  interest orientation), 
with the guiding value determined by the particular situation. Using a multidimensional concept  
of deliberation, we empirically test the impact of situational variables on specific aspects of 
deliberative quality. In addition, we take into account the temporal dimension of deliberation.
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1. Introduction
The theory of deliberative democracy is the most im-
portant  strand of  democratic  thought  today [1].  Its 
promise of greater legitimacy and better deliberative 
decision-making has achieved much attention in polit-
ical  practice.  Empirical  deliberation research aims at 
measuring the deliberative quality of communication. 
Since it is nearly impossible to measure deliberation in 
non-institutionalized, real-world situations [2], almost 
all studies analyze deliberation in institutionalized con-
texts. The most relevant institutionalized communica-
tion context in politics is parliament. Regarding parlia-
ment as the normative locus of deliberation has a long 
history in political theory and the history of ideas [3], 
which is why most studies address the variables that 
influence the quality of deliberation in parliamentary 
debates.
In this paper, we empirically analyze the deliberative 
quality of debates in two committees of the EU Parlia-
ment. We chose to analyze debates in the committees 
of  the  EU  Parliament  because  committees  are  the 
main locus of deliberation (if deliberation takes place 
at all). We chose the EU Parliament because, unlike 
the case in national parliaments, members must co-
operate as they search for a common policy beyond. 
Deliberation in EU committees can therefore be  ex-
pected to be higher than in national parliamentary
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committees. Using the DQI [4] we analyze the debate 
in  the  Monetary  and  Economic  Affairs  Committee 
(ECON)  on  the  "two-pack"  legislative  proposals  for 
European economic governance. We further analyze a 
joint debate in the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Committee on Wo-
men's Right and Gender Equality (FEMM) on a direct-
ive  regarding  the  rights,  support  and  protection  of 
victims of crime.
We  argue  that  two  sets  of  variables—situational 
variables and temporal variables—systematically influ-
ence the quality of deliberation in committee debates 
in  the  EU  Parliament.  Situational  variables  describe 
the  social  aspects  of  a  political  decision;  temporal 
variables describe the particular stage of the policy-
making  process.  The  importance  of  these  variables 
has been widely neglected in recent research [5].
To develop  our  argument,  we first  lay  down the 
theoretical background and the methods used in our 
analysis  (2).  Qualitative  interviews  were  held  with 
members of the EU Parliament regarding the import-
ance of the situational variables in the "two-pack" and 
the "directive on minimum standards on the rights, 
support and protection of victims of crime" [6,7]. The 
key findings of these interviews are presented in part 
(3). The quality of deliberation in the two committees 
has been analyzed using a slightly modified version of 
the DQI.  The findings  are  discussed in  section  (4). 
The  final  section  sums  up  the  key  findings  of  the 
empirical study (5).
2. Discussion of Concepts
2.1. Deficits of Current Debates on Parliamentary  
Deliberation
It  is  common to think of  parliamentary  deliberation 
normatively:  the  best  mode  of  communication  in  a 
parliament. But there is no overarching basic principle 
(idée directice) normatively guiding the work and the 
corresponding mode of communication of a represent-
ative.  Rather,  communication  in  parliament  has  two 
underlying normative ideals: search for the common 
good and responsive representation. Both basic ideas 
are normatively compelling and belong to two differ-
ent strands of political thought. Both serve as implicit 
or explicit normative guidelines for the communicative 
behavior of a representative. Hence, the analysis of 
the parliamentary  debates has to  take into account 
which basic principle actually guides a representative. 
A comprehensive evaluation of deliberative quality has 
to utilize two different benchmarks: a theoretical one 
grounded in the theory of deliberation and communic-
ative action, and an empirical  one, grounded in the 
subjective understanding of the representatives' work. 
Deliberation  is  more  likely  in  committee  than  in 
plenary debates, so the former should be the focus of 
analysis ([8], see [9-11]).
The European theory of deliberation, especially the 
works of Jürgen Habermas, has paid little attention to 
the one who is speaking and the problem to be solved. 
Gutman and Thompson [12] were the first to analyze 
the problem-solving capacity of deliberation with regard 
to  different  kinds  of  political  problems.  Drawing on 
these insights, this paper argues that political prob-
lems can systematically  hinder or  promote delibera-
tion, depending on the specific aspects they present.
The work of Steiner et al.  [13] has analyzed the 
impact of institutional macrostructures on deliberative 
quality in parliament. What has been neglected so far 
in empirical  deliberation research is the influence of 
the  procedural  microstructure  of  policymaking.  We 
argue that the situation and the particular  stage of 
policymaking in the EU Parliament shape the deliber-
ative quality of the debates.
2.2. Deliberation
Within a mere 10 years since prominent thinkers such 
as Jürgen Habermas [14], Bernand Manin [15], Cass 
Sunstein [16], Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson 
[12], James Bohman [17], and John Dryzek [18] began 
to  advocate  deliberative  democracy,  the  normative 
political theory gained stunning momentum. Bohman 
wrote of the "coming of age of deliberative democracy" 
in 1998 [19] and Simone Chambers judged that this 
strand  of  theory  entered  the  stage  of  a  "working 
theory" in 2004 [20]. Beginning with the turn of the 
century, deliberative democracy became an empirical 
theory in at least two ways: first, deliberative modes 
of decision-making became an increasingly large part 
of  political  practice,  first  in  the  USA,  and  then  all 
around the world; second,  the empirical  analysis  of 
the  deliberative  quality  of  communication  (empirical 
deliberation research) gained popularity, even though 
some  authors  still  cast  doubt  on  the  idea  that  a 
normative concept can be empirically measured [21,22].
Simply  put,  normative  deliberation  occurs  when 
there is a give and take of arguments between persons 
who consider each other as free and equal and treat 
each other respectfully.  They try to convince others 
rationally by giving reasons for their arguments and 
take the arguments of others into account. Deliberat-
ive processes are free from any constraints. According 
to Habermas, the only constraint admitted in a delib-
eration is the "forceless force of plausible reasons" [14]. 
Ultimately the mode of communication in a deliberative 
process is arguing, not bargaining. The normative goal 
of deliberation is consensus. Taken together, these fea-
tures of a communication situation constitute an ideal 
speech situation (see [14]).
Deliberation aims at the common good. After the 
linguistic turn in political philosophy, the common good 
is no longer defined in a substantial manner, but merely 
procedural.  Meeting  the  criteria  of  an  ideal  speech 
situation implies at the same time an orientation to-
wards the common good. Neither a philosopher nor a 
person participating in a deliberation knows what the 
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common good is (in a particular political question) be-
fore a deliberation about this concrete political question 
has taken place.
This normative definition of deliberation has been 
subject  to  numerous  criticisms  (e.g.  Sanders  [23]). 
Especially authors from the Anglo-American hemisphere 
have emphasized that the normative concept of delib-
eration is so demanding that it cannot even function 
as a regulatory ideal, since all real-world deliberation 
falls short of accomplishing the high normative stand-
ards put forward by Habermas [14]. Iris Marion Young 
[24]  has  argued  that  rational  deliberation  is  not  a 
neutral form of communication, as rational deliberation 
is  a  technique of  communication  that  favors  white, 
middle-class, and educated male speakers. Other modes 
of communication such as storytelling or greeting are 
not normatively valued, which discounts their speakers 
and leads to systematic distortions within rational de-
liberations.
For  the  longest  time,  the  differentia  specifica  of 
deliberation has been the use of arguments. It was 
clear that if bargaining occurred or self-interests played 
a major role during communication, there was no de-
liberation. But this line has blurred, at least since the 
now famous  article  by  Mansbridge  et  al.  [25].  The 
team of authors introduced self-interests as a legitim-
ate part of deliberation, and even though this sugges-
tion has been criticized for stretching the concept of 
deliberation too far, it was widely received. Taking into 
account  the  arguments  advanced,  Bächtiger  et  al. 
[26] propose to differentiate two types of deliberation: 
Type I deliberation, characterized by the Habermasian 
logic of communicative action aimed to reach a con-
sensus in rational discourse via the "unforced force of 
the better  argument";  and Type II  deliberation that 
includes other forms of communication, such as story-
telling, rhetoric, or even bargaining (Bächtiger et al. 
[26]).  This  runs  the  risk  of  making  deliberation  a 
catch-all  concept, with the "concept stretching" (see 
[27]) creating conceptual blurriness. If even bargain-
ing and self-interest are included, how shall we distin-
guish discourse from other forms of communication? 
As Bächtiger et al. ([26], p. 48) write: "almost all com-
municative act may qualify as 'deliberative'" (see also 
[28]).
2.3. Representation
There are two normative ideals of representation, a 
deliberative and a liberal one. Both are compelling and 
none is ethically superior. Historically, both idées direct-
rices have influenced the work and self-understanding 
of parliamentary representatives, and continue to do 
so today. Hence, an empirical analysis of the deliber-
ative  quality  of  parliamentary  debate  must  refrain 
from narrowing the normative scope to just one idée 
directrice but should embrace the normative pluralism 
found across parliaments.
From a deliberative perspective, the durational ex-
change of arguments makes up the normative heart 
of  parliamentary  decision-making  [14].  Through the 
give and take  of  rational  arguments,  deliberation  is 
expected to produce more consensual, epistemologic-
ally  improved outcomes.  For Habermas,  deliberation 
sets the sovereignty of the people "communicatively 
aflow" ([14], p. 486). Older studies see deliberation as 
the benchmark for ideal parliamentary communication 
(see  [13,14]).  But  recent  works  have  positioned 
deliberation as one of  many forms of  parliamentary 
communication  ranging  from  bargaining  (even  with 
threats and promises) to high-level deliberative debate 
(see [25,26]).
From a liberal point of view, the normative idea of 
representative democracy is responsiveness ([29,30]). 
This rests on the premises that every person is the 
best judge of his or her own interests; departing from 
the expressed preferences of  citizens would deprive 
them of their autonomy and could lead to morally in-
ferior forms of paternalistic government. In spite of this, 
most  strands  of  liberal  theory  value  a  free  mandate 
([31]; summarized in [32]). Accordingly, the normative 
ideals of representation in parliament oscillate between 
mere representations of citizen preferences and free 
deliberation in search for the common good. Deliberative 
quality in parliament depends not only on institutional 
variables but also on the two basic principles of repres-
entation  (deliberation  and  responsiveness)  and  their 
interaction with the self-understanding of  representat-
ives.
2.4. Conceptual Framework
Drawing on the basic ideas of Gutman and Thompson 
[12] we are convinced that specific aspects of a polit-
ical problem can influence the communicative behavior 
of representatives systematically and hence impact on 
deliberative quality. We argue that these aspects are 
not of substantial or essential nature; rather, they are 
socially and communicatively constructed [33].
To explain the communicative behavior of repres-
entatives, it is necessary to specify the basic assump-
tions of the underlying theory of action. We make two 
modest  basic  assumptions  that  avoid  the  excessive 
demands of normativity. First, the prime concern of a 
representative  is  reelection.  Reelection  depends  on 
the electorate's vote, and responsiveness to electorate 
preferences is the key for reelection. Following research 
on the principal-agent problem, we regard the respons-
iveness of  a representative as a question of  power, 
monitoring and transparency (see [34-36]). The more 
power a principal has, the better the ability to monitor 
the agent's actions; and the greater the transparency 
of political interaction, the more responsive the rep-
resentative will be (see [37]). The second assumption 
is  that  representatives  are  not  rational  actors  in  a 
Downsian sense (see [38]). They are believed to be 
responsive  to  the  electorate's  preferences,  but  they 
retain their own political preferences and goals.
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Building on these insights, we argue that socially 
constructed aspects of a political decision systematic-
ally influence the representative's ability to deliberate 
in a committee debate. Three elements are of major 
importance: the perceived salience of the topic; the 
perceived publicity of the topic; the perceived strength 
of particular interests involved. We call these variables 
situational variables. They are directly linked to power, 
monitoring,  and  transparency,  the  preconditions  for 
responsiveness  or  deliberativeness  from a  principal-
agent point of view. 
The salience of the topic denotes its importance for 
the electorate or the political party, as perceived by 
the representative.  Salience  strengthens  the  repres-
entative's responsiveness; actors exercise more pressure 
(power) on their representatives and expect them to 
follow their preferences; and voters and parties monitor 
the  representative  more  closely  (transparency). This 
reduces the representative's  ability  to deliberate,  as 
he or she must fear sanctions (e.g. non-reelection) in 
case  of  deviant  political  (communicative)  behavior 
(see [13,39]).
In mainstream deliberative theory, publicity is a key 
feature  of  deliberation  (see  [15,40]).  As  private  in-
terests  cannot  be  defended  in  front  of  a  public, 
publicity fosters high quality deliberation. Representat-
ives face particular audiences, however. In the face of 
reelection,  the  more  representatives  feel  observed 
(transparency), the more likely they are to focus on 
the interests of their principals (power), resorting to 
populist arguments in the public sphere at the expense 
of reasoning. European elections are generally described 
as "second order elections". On certain topics, however, 
the  public  attention  increases  (e.g.  in  the  Economic 
crisis).  More  generally,  representatives  react  to  the 
"perceived publicity", which increases on topics of broad 
public  interest.  Once  again,  the  relevant  situational 
variable is the perceived level of publicity (transparency).
Ideally, deliberation strives for the common good: a 
political solution that is good "for all". But representat-
ives are elected on national lists and accountable only 
to  their  voters.  When  particular  interests  (regional 
interests,  national  interests,  party  interests)  are  at 
stake,  deliberation  is  less  likely,  as  representatives 
focus on these interests (power, monitoring). 
We  also  take  into  account  the  anticipated  veto 
power (veto variable) of the Council  on each issue. 
Researchers have argued that the presence of veto-
players  strengthens  pressure  to  reach  agreement. 
Bächtiger/Hangartner [41] consider veto power as an 
"enabling constraint" favoring serious argument. Simil-
arly, in their study on deliberation in EP plenary de-
bates, Lord/Tamvaki [42] assume that the presence of 
the Council will positively influence deliberation in the 
EP,  but  the  empirical  results  were  ambiguous.  The 
authors found that veto power increases the common-
good  orientation  of  MEPs,  but  found  no  effect  on 
respect  levels  and  the  rationality  of  argumentation 
[42]. This paper analyzes the exercise of de facto veto-
power. As Fearon [43] shows, states value costs against 
expected  benefits:  when  benefits  are  high,  they  are 
more likely to hold out until an agreement is found that 
serves their interests. In this sense, the veto-risk differs 
from  legislative file to legislative file, which is why we 
assess the variable separately for each case studied. 
Drawing on insights by Robert Goodin (see [44]), 
we argue that in order to analyze the complexity of 
the deliberative processes, one has to "sequentialize 
deliberative  moments".  Deliberative  quality  changes 
over the course of a communication. Yet "no political 
philosopher would expect that communicative ration-
ality is present throughout the entire communication 
process" ([44], p. 3). A solution to this problem is the 
sequentialization  of  communication  processes.  The 
idea is that different modes of communication occur in 
different sequences of a communication process. As 
Bächtiger et al. point out, the dimensions of commu-
nication can be subjected to individual assessment: "a 
sequential perspective of communication processes not 
only unravels its dynamic nature, it can also be ideally 
linked to a conception of discourse types" ([45], pp. 3–4).
In this paper, we consider deliberation to be multi-
dimensional, and examine each aspect of deliberation 
separately. We take multi-dimensionality into account 
in the analysis of committee debates, arguing that the 
situational  and  temporal  variables  impact  differently 
on  each  dimension  of  deliberation.  The  situational 
variables are expected to influence the common-good 
orientation, respect levels, and the willingness to reach 
agreement. On issues salient to voters, representat-
ives  are more likely  to  focus on particular  interests 
and are more reluctant to compromise.
With regard to the temporal  variable, we assume 
that  different  deliberative  virtues  are  displayed  at 
different  stages  of  decision-making.  Starting  with  a 
common assumption in deliberation theory, we argue 
that  deliberative  processes  in  decision-making  pass 
through three stages in the ideal case ([46], see [47-
49]).  The first  stage is  mutual  understanding. Here 
people tell each other what their preferences are on a 
given  subject.  During  this  stage  of  communication, 
reasons are not necessary, as individual preferences 
have  yet  to  be  challenged.  The  second  stage  is 
justification. Here preferences are challenged, requiring 
people to give reasons justifying their positions. The 
final  stage is  decision-making. In this  stage, people 
must  consider  the  arguments  of  others  to  find  a 
compromise. As we will show, these three stages have 
analogous correlates for decision-making in EU com-
mittees. Accordingly, the study also accounts for the 
temporal dimension of deliberation. 
2.5. Measuring Deliberation
For our study we analyze two legislative decision-making 
procedures of the European Parliament. These legis-
lative procedures are similar with respect to the insti-
tutional setting but vary with regard to their situation-
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al  variables.  As  we  noted  already,  these  variables 
impact on representatives' communicative behavior as 
they  react  to  the  situation  of  decision-making  and 
adapt their behavior accordingly. We first analyze qual-
itative  interviews held with members and officials of 
the  European  Parliament  involved  in  the  decision-
making process. Second, we compare the quality of 
deliberation in selected committee debates. 
The  committee  debates  are  analyzed  using  the 
Discourse Quality Index [4], a well-known and uncon-
tested  instrument  for  assessing  deliberative  quality. 
The instrument was originally developed and applied 
to committee debates in three parliaments by Steiner 
et al. [13], and has since then be applied to various 
parliamentary  and  nonparliamentary  debates  (see 
[42,45,50,51]). This paper uses an extended Discourse 
Quality Index [52], adapted to parliamentary debates 
at the European level (see [53,54]).
The DQI measures  the quality  of  deliberation on 
the basis of speech acts (see Appendix 2 for the Dis-
course Quality Index). Drawing on Habermas' concept 
of  deliberation,  the  index  is  composed  of  several 
indicators aimed at assessing the distinctive dimensions 
of deliberation separately. Since an important element 
of  deliberation  is  free  and  equal  participation,  the 
indicator participation assesses the speaker's ability to 
take  part  in  the  debate  without  being  interrupted. 
Deliberation  also  requires  the  rational  exchange  of 
arguments. Speakers are asked to justify their argu-
ments in light of the "common good". The DQI cap-
tures both the quality (level of justification) and the 
content (common-good orientation) of the arguments 
made. It assesses how well an argument is justified 
and if the justification accounts for the best interest of 
all people concerned. For the purpose of this article, 
the "common good" is defined as the common interest 
of all European citizens. A "solidarity" indicator measures 
whether participants consider the consequences their 
position has for other people. As Landwehr [55] points 
out, actors may have particular, non-transferable in-
terests that are not necessarily common to all European 
citizens. Nevertheless, they may be legitimately articu-
lated in parliamentary debates [25]—as long as they 
do not hamper the interests of other citizens. 
Another central dimension of deliberation is respect. 
Respect  encompasses three dimensions:  respect  to-
wards  other  participants  during the  debate;  respect 
towards  demands  expressed;  and  respect  towards 
groups  concerned  by  the  policies  debated.  In  the 
debate, participants are required to listen and reply to 
each  other  (interactivity).  Since  "ideal  deliberation 
aims to  arrive  at  a  rationally  motivated  consensus" 
([40], p. 23), participants should be open-minded and 
consider the merits of each argument. If consensus is 
not  possible,  participants  should  be  the  willing  to 
reach a compromise (constructive politics). It is  im-
portant  that  participants  be  sincere  (veracity).  But 
since the sincerity of a speech cannot be assessed, 
the  indicator  is  not  included  in  the  DQI.  The  DQI 
assesses the quality of deliberation that ranges from 
no deliberation (if the indicators are not fulfilled) to 
the ideal form of discourse. The individual dimensions 
are  coded  separately.  Deliberation  is  considered  a 
multi-dimensional  concept. For example,  participants 
can  justify  their  arguments  but  refer  to  particular 
interests, and vice versa. The higher the code assigned 
to the speech act for each dimension, the better the 
quality of deliberation is.
Our  study  measures  the  impact  of  two  different 
sets of variables on the quality of deliberation in EU 
parliaments  committees:  situational  variables  and 
temporal variables (Figure 1) [56].
Figure 1. Variables. Source: own illustration.
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The three issue-related situational variables—topic 
salience, publicity, and interests—can be expected to 
foster the responsiveness of a representative towards 
his voters, and thus to negatively impact on his ability 
to deliberate. Responsive representatives are assumed 
to be oriented toward particular interests, to be less 
respectful with regard to the interests of other groups 
and to be less willing to compromise. The more sali-
ent a topic, the higher the perceived publicity, and the 
more interests at stake, the less likely we are to find 
common-good orientation,  compromise,  and  respect 
within a debate.
Deliberative  quality  is  also  mediated  by  the  per-
ceived need  of  unanimity  within  a  political  decision 
(see [41,55]). Unanimity increases the political relev-
ance of a decision and the chances of enforcing a polit-
ical decision vis-à-vis other political actors or institutions. 
The Council of the European Union may function as a 
(pseudo) veto player against the European Parliament. 
In case of conflict, the quality of deliberation in parlia-
ment will increase due to the need to agree on a strong 
common position. Accordingly, the willingness to com-
promise is expected to increase in case of conflict with 
the Council.
With regard to the temporal variable, we draw on 
Goodin's [44] argument that deliberative quality changes 
over  time  ("sequentialization").  Deliberative  quality 
can therefore be expected to vary systematically over 
the  course  of  the  ideal  decision-making  stages.  In 
European Parliament committees, legislative proposals 
are debated in three stages: exchanges of views, draft 
reports, and consideration of amendments. The three 
stages can be seen as analogous to the three stages 
of deliberation we presented above. Accordingly, the 
level  of  interactivity,  willingness  to  compromise  and 
the level of justification increase with every stage.
The first stage aims at exchanging information. Rep-
resentatives make an initial statement on the legislat-
ive proposal without justifying it. In the second stage, 
the draft reports are presented and discussed, increas-
ing the level  of deliberation.  The rapporteurs justify 
their proposals and representatives supply comments 
and  reach  provisional  compromises.  The  debate  is 
more interactive, and representatives reply to the rap-
porteur. At the final stage, amendments are presented 
and  considered  at  a  high  level  of  deliberation.  Be-
cause this is the last opportunity for representatives to 
defend their position, compromise becomes central, as 
this may be the only way to get amendments adopted. 
The level of interactivity is expected to be high and 
involve much discussion of proposed amendments [57].
3. Empirical Part: Analyzing the Situation and 
the Quality of Deliberation
The  study  analyzes  the  committee  debates  on  two 
legislative files. Both debates take place in comparable 
institutional settings—the first reading in parliamentary 
committees—but differ with regard to the situational 
variables.  The  debates  take  place  in  three  stages, 
each analyzed separately: the exchange of views, the 
presentation  of  draft  reports,  the  consideration  of 
amendments. We demonstrate that the quality of de-
liberation differs in both debates, and at each stage of 
procedure. We then argue that situational and temporal 
variables mostly account for these differences. 
3.1. Assessing the Impact of Situational and Temporal  
Variables
The analysis focuses on two legislative proposals: a 
package  of  two  regulations  on  European  economic 
governance  and  a  directive  on  victim's  rights.  The 
two-pack is made up of two legislative regulations: a 
proposal  on  an  enhanced  economic  surveillance  of 
Member States in risky situations and a proposal on a 
better  oversight  of  economic  and  budgetary  policy. 
Both proposals were debated together in the Commit-
tee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). The 
two-pack deals with questions that are at the heart of 
the debate on economic governance at the European 
level but that also have important consequences for 
national budgetary sovereignty. These issues are similar 
to those regulated by the fiscal compact, adopted by 
the Member States in March 2012. The two-pack can 
be considered a highly salient issue in the light of the 
financial  crisis, while the question of European gov-
ernance has been much debated in the broader public. 
The legislation is also important for the Council, whose 
veto-power is expected to be strong. 
The  directive  on  victim's  rights  strengthens  the 
rights of victims in the European Union. The proposal 
was jointly debated by the Committee on Civil Liber-
ties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), and the Com-
mittee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). 
Unlike the two-pack, the topic is neither salient nor 
debated in the broader public. The directive also differs 
from the  two-pack  regarding  the  demands  and  in-
terests at stake. Every European citizen is concerned 
as a possible future victim, and there are no national 
or other particular interests involved. Hence, the victims 
directive is a nonsalient, noncontroversial issue touch-
ing common, European interests, in which the veto-
power of the Council can be expected to be weak.
Situational variables affect deliberative quality de-
pending on how they are perceived by the participants 
of deliberation.  The representatives are expected to 
react to the situational  variables and to adapt their 
communicative behavior accordingly. In the next section, 
we turn to qualitative interviews, and analyze the situ-
ational variables as perceived by the participants  of 
debate.
3.1.1. Situational Variables
To identify the relevance of situational variables, we 
conducted qualitative interviews with the main actors 
of debate [58] (see Appendix 1 for the questionnaire 
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and  Appendix  3  for  the  list  of  interviews).  In  the 
European  Parliament  parliamentary  committees  are 
the central loci of decision-making ([59,60]). Due to 
increasing workload, the decision-making process has 
been rationalized and the working load divided among 
the members ([61]). Within the committee, few rap-
porteur(s)  and  shadow rapporteurs  are  assigned  to 
handle the legislative proposal.  The rapporteur is  in 
charge of drafting the report, while the shadow rap-
porteurs comment on it for their political group. In the 
debates, speaking time is equally distributed amongst 
(shadow) rapporteurs, and other members intervene 
only if there is time left for debate. In our study, qual-
itative interviews were made with nearly all  rappor-
teurs both on the two-pack and the victims directive. 
In addition, interviews were made with members of 
the  secretariat,  political  advisors,  and  assistants  of 
MEPs  working on the  legislative  proposal  [62].  The 
interviewees were asked to describe the process of 
decision-making,  and  to  evaluate  the  salience  and 
publicity of the topic and the role of the Council [63]. 
The  interviews  were  face-to-face,  held  in  English, 
French,  or  German (some of  the  quotes  below are 
translated), lasted between ten minutes and one hour, 
and  were  transcribed  and  coded  in  MaxQDA.  The 
results are presented in the following section.
As expected, representatives perceived the two-pack 
as a very salient issue. In the interviews, the two-pack 
was qualified as one of the most important pieces of 
legislation the parliament dealt with at the time of the 
interviews [64]. The topic raised the attention of non-
committee members as well, and was commonly con-
sidered a "hot topic, a politically important  topic" [65] 
both for the political groups and for Member States. 
Tellingly, the EP leadership paid close attention to the 
decision-making process and the proposals were dis-
cussed at the highest level of hierarchy [66].
Since the beginning of the financial crisis, issues of 
European governance have dominated public debate. 
The  interviewees  agreed  that  economic  questions 
were at the "spotlight" [67] and often referenced the 
national public debates on European governance. The 
committee debate on the two-pack took place during 
the  French  election  campaign;  several  interviewees 
indicated that the campaign was also important for 
decision-making in the European Parliament [68]:
"There is this campaign Berlin-Paris, so I hope the 
vote on the two-pack will  take place much later. 
Otherwise,  I  am afraid  it  will  be  very  difficult—
perhaps regardless of the content of the package in 
the end—for the [party] in this parliament to vote 
for it, for purely symbolic reasons" [69].
"[The political  groups have to] take into account 
national elections obviously […] how the national 
debate is at the moment" [67].
There were strong particular and national demands 
at stake, as citizens have been directly touched by the 
crisis. This made it very difficult for representatives—
especially for those coming from countries with serious 
economic  problems—to  neglect  the  demands  ex-
pressed by their voters. As the following statement of 
an MEP shows, the economic situation of their own 
Member  State  was  determinant  for  the  political 
opinion of the representatives:
"I am [Member State] […] from the point of view 
of someone who is Greek or Portuguese or Irish 
and who is perfectly aware about the probability of 
attaining the objectives of the Troika—it is nearly 
impossible,  even  if  one  wants  to  attain  it,  it  is 
impossible—so I have to be against any automatic 
sanctions […] In theory, I do prefer economic co-
ordination at the EU level and I am clearly against 
intergovernmentalism, but from a practical point of 
view, in a situation of bad economic coordination 
and where divergences between countries play a 
role, if I want to be with the weakest, I have to 
oppose the mechanism of automatic sanctions by 
the Commission" [70].
In the context of the crisis, national considerations 
were of major importance to the MEPs and nearly all 
interviewees mentioned them.
Under  these  circumstances,  representatives  are 
unlikely to deliberate: they are asked to focus on par-
ticular interests, and to defend them in the decision-
making process. Their voters and principals watched 
them,  restraining  their  action  scope  in  the  debate. 
Against this background, the important risk of being 
vetoed by the Council is the only situational variable 
expected to play in favor of deliberation. The Council 
was  concerned  that  the  two-pack  may  hamper  the 
validity  of  the  treaty  and  was  hence  reluctant  to 
include  the  treaty  provisions  in  the  two-pack  (as 
proposed by the rapporteurs):
"[The Member States] fear that the two-pack be-
comes a reality, it is a regulation, before the inter-
governmental treaty would be ratified. […] When 
would that be? I don't know. […] And the Member 
States are attached to the treaty […] so it is not in 
their  interest  to be flexible  in  the negotiations if 
there is something they don't like. They will be able 
to say, see, one cannot get an agreement with this 
lousy  parliament.  So  the  communitarian  method, 
which obliges us to pass by the parliament, in co-
decision, delays, is inefficient, so it is better to go 
with the intergovernmental method" [66].
The European Parliament disagreed with the Coun-
cil  on several  points of the proposal,  and the MEPs 
expected severe conflicts in the course of the negoti-
ation process. In such a contentious context, a united 
EP position was considered to be crucial for strength-
ening Parliament's position in the negotiation process 
with the Council:
"If one wants to win, one needs a large majority of 
the Parliament,  so the rapporteur that negotiates 
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on behalf of the parliament can rely on the majority. 
If he is not told that, finally, you represent 30 votes 
more than the one that acts against you" [66].
From this  perspective,  compromising  became es-
sential  for  the  European  Parliament  to  avoid  being 
overruled  by  the  Council.  But  the  content  of  the 
legislative act was highly controversial, and the potential 
for compromise limited. MEPs admitted the need for a 
broad  agreement,  but  stressed  that  they  were  not 
willing to compromise at any price [71]. As one official 
stated:
"When something is so political and ideological as 
the two-pack, like in the six-pack, if you have to 
vote  against  it,  you  vote  against  it.  You  cannot 
always compromise. Because there is a right-wing 
majority  in  the Council  and there is  a  right-wing 
majority in the Parliament, obviously they are going 
to get some kind of agreement that fits them. So in 
that kind of scenario we vote against it" [71].
In  sum,  the  issue  of  economic  governance  was 
controversially discussed both at the national and at 
the European level. MEPs were confronted with differ-
ent  particular  demands  from  their  political  groups, 
their Member States, and their voters. In this context, 
the parliamentary debate took place under situational 
constraints.  MEPs  were  aware  of  the  salience  and 
publicity of the issue, and accordingly paid high atten-
tion  to  the  interest  of  their  voters  and  their  party/
political group. Consequently, they cannot be expected 
to  focus  on  a  common  European  interest  in  the 
debate or to show explicit  respect for the demands 
and interests  of  other groups.  Nevertheless,  due to 
the  conflicts  with  the  Council,  the  veto-risk  was 
important and the debate took place under pressure 
to reach a common position. The veto-risk strengthened 
the willingness to compromise, even though an agree-
ment was difficult to reach.
The victims'  directive  differed  from the  two-pack 
regarding the situational variables. First of all, while 
personally salient to them, the interviewees admitted 
that the general attention paid to the topic was fairly 
low. The (shadow) rapporteurs were charged by their 
groups with handling the legislative proposal, but the 
groups  did  not  closely  follow  the  decision-making 
process  in  the  committee  [72].  Rather,  the  political 
groups were informed by their shadows on the agree-
ment reached in the committee once the compromises 
between  the  shadow  rapporteurs  have  been  made 
[73]. The interviewees did not expect much controversy 
within their groups but expected their groups to follow 
their  voting  recommendations  and  thus  were  inde-
pendent of external constraints in the committee debate.
The public attention paid to the topic was also low. 
The issue  was  rarely  mentioned in  the  media,  and 
MEPs did not expect the citizens to be aware of the 
legislative  proposal.  MEPs  did  not  feel  observed  by 
their  voters  and  their  principals;  rather,  they  were 
afraid that the proposal might receive too little attention.
"Groups  of  opinion and  the  NGOs will  be happy 
with [the directive] but the particular citizens don't 
even know what we are working on. […] If we are 
talking  about  a  directive,  they  don't  even  know 
what a directive is, what a regulation is, what the 
Council, the Commission, committees are" [74].
"A majority decided to rush […] and they are kind 
of stressed because if you take your time now then 
nobody is going to be interested in it and then it's  
going to be stopped" [75].
Unlike  the  debate  on  the  two-pack,  which  had 
particular demands and interests at stake, MEPs were 
free from external  pressures when dealing with the 
directive. The political groups all agreed on the need 
to strengthen the rights of victims. As several persons 
indicated  in  the  interviews,  there  was  a  broad 
consensus on the main points of the directive within 
the parliament, across all political groups [76].
"In general, there is a total agreement. Of course, 
there  are  minor  issues  where  there  can  be 
problems […]. But the most important lines are ok. 
Great support for victims all around Europe" [77].
"I mean maybe some think that is true that when 
we are talking about victims it is very difficult that 
there is not a consensus. Why? Because who is the 
one who dares to say something against victims?" 
[74].
With  regard  to  interinstitutional  negotiations,  the 
interviewees expected a conflict with the Council on 
the costs of the directive [78]. In the context of the 
crisis,  Member  States  aimed  at  reducing  public 
expenditures. In this perspective, MEPs outlined the 
need to agree on a common position  with a broad 
majority to strengthen parliaments bargaining power 
in the negotiation process with the Council [79].
"For  instance,  the  Commission  now  proposes  an 
individual  assessment  for  victims  that  I  think  is 
very good, which is crucial and I am pretty sure the 
Council will say that's very costly and who is going 
to pay for that?" [74].
In  sum,  the  situation  of  decision-making  for  the 
victims  directive  favored  deliberation:  the  topic  was 
not considered as salient, the public attention paid to 
it  was  low,  and  there  were  no  major  national  or 
particular interests at stake. Under these circumstances, 
MEPs are free to deliberate and may follow their own 
judgment and focus on a common European interest. 
They are expected to show respect for each other's 
interests and the interests of the groups concerned by 
the policy. In addition, the conflict with the Council is 
likely to favor MEPs willingness to compromise.
The situational variables are expected to impact on 
specific dimensions of deliberation, namely the European 
focus (common good and solidarity),  the level  of  re-
spect, and the willingness to compromise. The two-pack 
was  salient,  publicly  debated,  and  involved  particular 
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interests. By contrast, the victims directive raised no 
attention in the Parliament, was not debated by the 
broader public, and aimed at strengthening the rights 
of victims in Europe. The quality of deliberation on the 
above-named  dimensions  can  be  expected  to  be 
higher in the victims directive debate than on the two-
pack debate. 
3.1.2. Temporal Variables
As we noted, our study adopts a sequential approach 
and  distinguishes  between  different  stages  of  de-
cision-making. In the European Parliament a legislat-
ive proposal is debated in three stages before the vote 
in the committee. The temporal variable is expected 
to impact on three dimensions of deliberation: inter-
activity, justification, and the willingness to compromise. 
With regard to these indicators,  the overall  level  of 
deliberation is expected to increase during the process. 
The following section demonstrates that the three 
stages of decision-making fulfill different functions in 
the parliamentary decision-making process. Based on 
the interviews and on statements MEPs made in the 
committee meetings, this section analyzes the temporal 
aspect of parliamentary deliberation as perceived by 
the actors of debate. The next section turns to dis-
course analysis, in which each stage of debate is sep-
arately analyzed.
The main purpose of the exchange of views is to 
share information. Conversation is aimed at informing 
the  committee  members  on the  legislative  proposal 
and the rapporteur(s) take(s) on the different views 
the shadow rapporteurs have on the proposal [80]. 
Though  the  decision-making  has  just  started  and 
political  groups  have  not  necessarily  agreed  on  a 
strong position [81], the exchange of views allows a 
first  impression  of  the  proposal  and  the  different 
positions in the parliament.
MEPs are relatively open to discuss the proposal, as 
they usually have yet to develop a strong opinion on 
it.  MEPs make initial  statements on the commission 
proposal, stating their support or refusal and outlining 
possible conflicting points:
"I  would  start  by  thinking  that  we  need  those 
regulations.  […] There is  no question that  these 
can be useful instruments. That said, I will  make 
two comments on [the regulation]" [82].
Given  the  fact  that  MEPs  tend  to  make  general 
statements, we expect the level of justification to be 
lower in the exchange of views than in the following 
debates. Participants do not necessarily have to justify 
their position, especially because they have not neces-
sarily developed their own position. Also, the debates 
are not expected to be very interactive. It is difficult 
for MEPs to comment on the positions of  their  col-
leagues,  as  they  are  not  always  aware  of  them. 
Consider this statement: "I would also prefer to wait 
for the amendments tabled by colleagues to see what 
we can do with this proposal" [83]. In a similar vein, 
the orientation towards compromising is expected to 
be  relatively  low,  as  there  is  simply  no  need  to 
compromise at this stage of the process. 
In the second stage, the rapporteurs present their 
report  (e.g.  submit  their  main  propositions  to  their 
colleagues) and justify their proposals. The (shadow) 
rapporteurs  are  asked to  reply  to  the  presentation. 
The  debate  is  aimed  at  discussing  the  legislative 
proposal  in  more  detail  and  at  exchanging  ideas 
presented  by  the  rapporteurs  in  their  report.  As  a 
(shadow) rapporteur outlined in the interview:
"I  was  starting  with  the  idea  that  [the  topic] 
needed to be largely debated in the parliament […] 
but  [the  MEPs]  should  not  be  constrained  by  a 
personal position that they would have taken at the 
beginning. If you want to open a debate, you have 
to limit yourself to the presentation of the ideas, 
but say that you will try to find the best conditions 
together" [66].
In general, the level of justification is expected to 
be higher than in the first debate. Rapporteurs need 
to thoroughly justify their proposals to get support for 
their reports, and shadow rapporteurs in their com-
mittee statements express support for the report, or 
outline disagreements:
"Then there are some issues that I think need to 
be very thoroughly analyzed […]. That is my firm 
belief.  There  are  some  changes  made  by  the 
rapporteur that I am not sure I can sign off on at 
this point in time. We need to discuss this and I am 
sure  that  will  cause  a  lot  of  debate  further  on 
considering the atmosphere in the Council" [84].
Shadow  rapporteurs  also  use  the  opportunity  to 
prepare  their  amendments  and  focus  on the  issues 
that are of main importance to them and their political 
groups. Since representatives are asked to comment 
on the earlier proposals by the rapporteur, the level of 
interactivity is expected to be higher than in the first 
debate. In addition, representatives explore possible 
compromises and make initial mediating proposals on 
the report presented by the rapporteur. 
In  the  last  session,  the  amendments  made  by 
shadow  rapporteurs  are  presented  and  considered. 
The session  on the  amendments  is  commonly  con-
sidered the most important one:
"I think that the real debate will be on the amend-
ments and the compromise amendments. This will 
be the real debate" [85].
Indeed, the last debate is of major importance for 
two reasons. First, the positions of each participant—
and,  via  the  shadow  rapporteurs,  of  each  political 
group—are  publicly  presented  and  openly  debated. 
Second, the debate is the last opportunity for parti-
cipants to justify their position and to persuade their 
colleagues and their voters. Accordingly, we assume 
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justification to be highest at the last stage of decision-
making. Compromises are likely to occur as well. In 
the European Parliament compromise is vital for rep-
resentatives to get their position included in the final 
legislative  act  when  there  is  no  clear-cut  majority. 
Shadow rapporteurs  outline  the  points  important  to 
them while  signaling  their  support  for  and/or  their 
disagreement  with  the  report.  The  purpose  is  to 
achieve  a  compromise  in  which  their  interests  are 
included:
"…and  I  can  whole  heartily  endorse  these  forty 
compromise amendments except from two […]. So 
compromises two and three are rather unfortunate. 
I  would  have  preferred them to  be worded in  a 
different way, but as I said, apart from that, I am 
whole heartily  behind the rapporteurs'  proposals" 
[86].
Regarding the impact of the temporal variable, we 
expect  the  level  of  deliberation  to  increase  on  the 
levels of justification, interactivity, and willingness to 
compromise. 
In  the  first  part  of  the  paper,  we  analyzed  the 
situational variables as perceived by the representatives. 
Based on the results of our analysis, we formulated 
theoretical expectations on their communicative beha-
vior. We adopted a sequential approach and discussed 
the impact of the temporal variable on the quality of 
deliberation. The second part of the paper now turns 
to the speech acts of representatives. The analysis will 
permit us to verify the assumption that the situation 
and stage of decision-making matter for deliberative 
quality. 
3.2. Discourse Analysis
In our study we focused on the two-pack debates in 
the ECON committee and the victims directive debates 
in joint sessions of the FEMM/LIBE committees. Both 
proposals were debated in three stages: exchange of 
views, presentation of the draft report, and considera-
tion  of  amendments.  In  the  following  section,  we 
assess the deliberative quality of the committee de-
bates and discuss the impact of situational and tem-
poral variables.
Our analysis takes into account the multidimension-
ality of deliberation. We did not expect the variables 
to  equally  influence  all  aspects  of  deliberation.  The 
following section briefly summarizes the assumptions 
about the impact of these variables on deliberation.
We  expected  situational  variables  to  matter  for 
justification, respect, and willingness to compromise. 
We expected the  overall  level  of  deliberation  to  be 
higher in the victims directive debate than in the two-
pack  debate.  Generally,  the  victims  directive  was 
perceived as a noncontroversial and less salient issue. 
The attention the broader public and the media pay to 
the topic was low, if not nonexistent. Representatives 
were  expected to  be  free  from external  constraints 
and to be open for other arguments (respect). Because 
they did not have to account for particular interests, we 
assumed that they would emphasize general European 
interests (content of justification). In addition, there was 
an important risk of the Council's vetoing the issue of 
costs, which would strengthen representatives' willing-
ness  to  seek  compromise  (constructive  politics).  In 
sum, we expected both topic-related variables and the 
veto variable to increase the level of deliberation with 
regard to respect, common-good orientation, and will-
ingness to compromise.
By contrast, there were strong particular and na-
tional interests at stake with the two-pack. The topic 
is commonly perceived as very salient and MEPs were 
closely monitored by their national party, their govern-
ment, and their European political group. In the debate 
on  the  two-pack,  the  overall  quality  of  deliberation 
was expected to be relatively low. Representatives felt 
more  constrained  in  the  debate;  it  was  difficult  for 
them to neglect the demands of their voters and their 
principals.  Accordingly, they were expected to focus 
on  particular  interests  and  to  score  low  on  the 
common-good indicator. In addition, they were probably 
less open when it came to the interests of other groups. 
Nevertheless, as with the victims directive, the Council's 
vetoing posed a major risk. We expected MEPs to aim 
at an agreement and compromise, even if the process 
was difficult, in order to strengthen Parliament's position 
in the bargaining process with the Council. 
The temporal variable was expected to matter with 
regard to interactivity, justification, and willingness to 
compromise. For these three dimensions, deliberative 
quality was expected to improve over the three stages 
of  debate.  In  this  study,  we  made  no  distinction 
between the victims directive and the two-pack.  As 
we  argued,  the  situational  and  temporal  variables 
affect different dimensions of deliberation. Hence, the 
scores  for  justification,  respect,  and  compromising 
were expected to differ between the two debates, but 
the level of interactivity, justification, and compromising 
was expected to evolve in similar fashion. Both debates 
were expected to improve from the first to the third 
debate with regard to these three dimensions.
The first debate aimed at exchanging information, 
and displayed a fairly low level of deliberation. In the 
second  debate—the  presentation  and  discussion  of 
the draft report—the level of deliberation was expected 
to increase, with the rapporteurs justifying their pro-
posals and representatives supplying commentary. At 
the final stage, we expected deliberation to be at the 
highest level. The debate was the last opportunity for 
the representatives to defend their position, which is 
why we expected the level of justification to be high. 
At this stage compromise also became central. To get 
their  amendments  adopted,  representatives  had  to 
reach agreement with others, creating a high level of 
interactivity. 
The next section turns to discourse analysis. The 
first  part  examines  the  situational  dimension  of 
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deliberation and compares the overall level of deliber-
ation between the two-pack and the victims directive 
debate. The section then turns to the decision-making 
process and examines the level of deliberation at each 
stage of debate. 
4. Empirical Findings
The DQI was applied to the committee debates in the 
first reading on the two-pack and the victims directive. 
The  committee  debates  are  available  for  streaming 
and downloading on the website of the European Par-
liament [87]. Based on the video records, the debates 
were  transcribed.  Speeches  in  English,  French  and 
German were coded in the original language. For all 
other speeches, it was referred to the German transla-
tion. The results are reported in Table 1 [88].
The results indicate that the situation of decision-
making  influences  the  parliamentary  debates  and 
impacts on deliberative quality. As expected, the level 
of deliberation differed between the two debates with 
regard  to  justification  and  respect.  Concerning  the 
content of justification,  the overall  level  of common 
good-orientation  was  higher  in  the  victims  directive 
debate (1.8 points) than in the two-pack debate (1.4 
points).  The  difference  holds  in  all  three  stages  of 
decision-making, but the gap is most significant in the 
last  debate.  There,  the  level  of  common  good-ori-
entation is about 1.2 points in the two-pack debate, 
while the victims directive debate scores the highest 
possible value (2 points). Nevertheless, the results for 
the  solidarity  indicator  attenuate  the  differences 
somewhat.  In  their  speeches  representatives  in  the 
Economic  and Monetary  Affairs  Committee  implicitly 
considered the consequences their demands have for 
the people concerned. 
The two debates also differed on the level of re-
spect. As expected, the overall  level of respect was 
higher in the victims directive debate than in the two-
pack debate with regard to the three dimensions of 
respect. The differences are especially significant with 
respect towards other groups. In the victims directive 
debate,  the  mean  score  range  is  about  1.6  points 
versus  a  score  about  1.07  points  in  the  two-pack 
debate. The gap continues with the other two dimen-
sions of respect: respect towards other participants, 
and respect towards the demands expressed by other 
participants.  In  general,  speeches  in  the  two-pack 
debate were neutral but not expressly respectful. By 
contrast, the overall level of respect was high in the 
victims directive debate. 
In  sum, the  deliberative  qualities  of  the  debates 
differ from each other as expected. Surprisingly, how-
ever, there were more attempts to compromise in the 
two-pack debate,  with a mean score of  about 1.23 
points for the two-pack debate versus 1.03 points for 
the victims directive debate. As we argued, the veto-
power of the Council created pressure on participants 
to  compromise  in  the  two-pack  debate  and  in  the 
victims  directive  debate.  But  the  de  facto  veto risk 
was more significant in the two-pack debate because 
it  touched  strong  national  interests.  Moreover,  the 
two-pack debate was more controversial than the vic-
tims  directive  debate.  Hence,  the  necessity  to  com-
promise was higher in the two-pack debate than in the 
victims  directive  debate  (where  there  was  general 
agreement from the beginning of the legislative process). 
Concerning  the  situational  variables,  our  basic 
assumptions were confirmed. Particular interests played 
a major role in the debate on European governance, 
and the level of common good and respect were lower 
in the committee debate. By contrast, victims' rights 
were perceived as uncontroversial, universal rights. As 
expected, representatives justified their arguments by 
reference to the common-good and displayed mutual 
respect. The veto-power of the Council strengthened 
the compromise-orientation in both debates, especially 
the one on the two-pack,  where  the veto risk  was 
more important. 
We expected the quality of deliberation to improve 
in  the  decision-making  process,  regardless  of  the 
situation. The temporal variable was assumed to influ-
ence the dimensions of interactivity, justification and—
as the veto variable—the willingness to compromise. 
This study focuses on the average score of delibera-
tion, taking both debates together. Table 2 presents 
the average values for the deliberative quality of both 
debates.
These  findings  support  the  main  assumption  ac-
cording to which the quality of deliberation improves 
during the decision-making process. As expected, the 
overall level of deliberation is lower in the first debate 
and increases in the following debates.
With  regard  to  the  differences  between  the  ex-
change of views and the following two debates, the 
results indicate that the exchange of view is aimed at 
exchanging information and making preliminary state-
ments. Accordingly, the general quality of deliberation 
is  relatively  low in the  first  debate.  The result  was 
found with each of the three dimensions: the debates 
were not interactive, the level of justification was low, 
and there were no attempts to compromise. In the 
following  debate,  when  the  report  was  presented, 
participants  started  to  exchange  arguments,  justify 
their  points  of  view,  and  make initial  compromises. 
The level  of  justification  increased from a relatively 
low mean score of about 1.39 points at the beginning 
to a value of 2 points in the second debate and 2.19 
points  in  the  last  debate.  The  mean  score  of  the 
"constructive politics" indicator improved by 0.8 points 
from the first debate (0.57 points) to the second and 
third debate (1.38 points). 
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Table 1. Deliberative quality.
N
Participation*
Level of 
justification
Content of justification
Respect
Interactivity
Constructive 
politics
Interruption
Level
Com
m
on 
good
Solidarity
Participants
Other 
groups
Dem
ands
Part.
Arg.
ECO
N
0–1
0–4
0–2
0–3
0–2
0–2
0–2
0–1
0–2
0–4
Exchange of 
view
s
8
1
1.88
1.5
1.75
1.25
1
1.13
0.63
0.38
0.5
Presentation of 
draft report
17
1
2.47
1.53
1.88
1.35
1
1.18
0.94
1.47
1.29
Consideration of 
am
endm
ents
18
1
2.25
1.22
1.89
1.44
1.17
1.17
1
1.28
1.5
Overall quality**
43
1
2.26
1.40
1.86
1.37
1.07
1.16
0.91
1.19
1.23
FEM
M
/LIBE
Exchange of 
view
s
15
0.94
1.14
1.67
1.87
1.07
1.47
1
0.33
0.27
0.6
Consideration of 
draft report
12
1
1.33
1.83
1.83
1.67
1.75
1.42
0.92
1.08
1.5
Consideration of 
am
endm
ents
8
1
2.25
2
1.75
1.88
1.63
1.25
1
1.63
1.13
Overall quality**
35
0.97
1.43
1.80
1.83
1.46
1.60
1.2
0.69
0.89
1.03
Notes: *All num
bers are m
ean values. The higher the code assigned to the speech acts for each dim
ension, the better the deliberative quality. **The overall 
quality is calculated based on the speech acts of all three debates taken together. Source: ow
n calculation.
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Table 2. Stages of deliberation.
Exchange of
views*
Presentation of
draft report
Consideration of 
amendments
Participation 0.96 1 1
Level of justification 1.39 2 2.19
Content of justification
Common good 1.61 1.66 1.46
Solidarity 1.83 1.86 1.85
Respect
Participants 1.13 1.48 1.58
Other groups 1.30 1.31 1.31
Demands 1.04 1.28 1.19
Interactivity
Towards participants 0.43 0.93 1
Towards arguments 0.30 1.31 1.38
Constructive politics 0.57 1.38 1.38
Overall quality of deliberation** 1.06 1.46 1.43
Notes: *All numbers are mean values, calculated on the bases of the individual speech acts.  
**Mean value of all the mean scores of all dimensions of deliberation. Source: own calculation.
The interactivity also increased during the three de-
bates with regard to both participants and arguments. 
The  results  indicate  that  the  two stages  of  debate 
clearly  fulfilled  different  functions,  confirming  the 
theoretical considerations discussed above. In the first 
debate participants informed each other of the pro-
posals and their points of view; in the second debate 
participants sought to exchange arguments with the 
aim of convincing other participants.
The  evolution  was  particularly  important  at  the 
beginning of deliberation but diminished in the later 
two debates. While the level of justification and inter-
activity increased by about 0.7 points, the willingness 
to compromise stagnated at 1.38 points. This indicates 
that compromise was just as important in the second 
debate (the presentation of the draft report) as in the 
final debate (when amendments were considered). 
The compromise may also have taken place outside 
official  committee  debates,  in  informal  negotiations 
between  the  shadow rapporteurs.  In  this  case,  the 
compromises  would  already  have  been  considered 
before  the  presentation  of  the  amendments  in  the 
committee  meetings.  During  the  presentation  of 
amendments the shadows would then insist on their 
positions  and  justify  them carefully  to  show voters 
that  they  had  acted  in  their  interests,  especially  if 
their amendments had not been taken into account in 
the compromises.  As an official  stated in the inter-
views, the submission of amendments opens the floor 
for  bargaining  processes:  "on  Monday,  the  amend-
ments will be submitted. Then we will try to enter into 
negotiations, of course" [89].
In this view, deliberation takes place in the second 
meeting; the third session opens negotiations between 
entrenched positions. To make a definitive conclusion, 
further research is needed.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the quality of deliberation in 
European  Parliament  committees.  We  argued  that 
communication in committees is normatively framed 
by two antagonistic ideals, deliberation (common good 
orientation)  and  responsiveness  (particular  interest 
orientation). These ideals influence the communicative 
behavior of representatives and hence impact on the 
quality  of  deliberation.  The  first  part  of  the  paper 
discussed the impact of  the situational  variables on 
the quality  of  deliberation.  Next  we identified three 
stages of  communication in the deliberative process 
with distinctive profiles of deliberative quality. As we 
argued,  these  stages  can  be  likened  to  the  three 
stages  of  the  decision-making  process  in  European 
parliament committees. 
Based on a speech act analysis, we examined the 
committee debates of two distinctive decision-making 
processes. In both cases, we looked at the complete 
committee debates,  from the exchange of  views to 
the consideration of amendments. The empirical data 
support  the  assumptions  regarding  the  impact  of 
situational and temporal variables. As we expected, at 
all  three  stages the level  of  deliberation  differed in 
both cases, especially on the content of justification 
and the level of respect. Our findings indicate that the 
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situation of decision-making matters for the debate: 
the higher the perceived salience and publicity of a 
topic and the more particular the demands, the lower 
the  quality  of  deliberation  for  these  dimensions.  In 
addition,  a  second general  variable  was introduced: 
the veto variable. We assumed that the threat of a 
Council veto would improve the deliberative quality of 
the debates in the committees, and favor the willing-
ness to compromise of the participants. As our analysis 
shows, there were more de facto attempts to com-
promise in the debate on the two-pack, where the risk 
of a Council veto was higher than in the case of the 
victims  directive.  Our  interviews  also  confirm  the 
importance  of  an  external  threat  for  the  quality  of 
deliberation in committee debates.
In  addition,  our  findings  show  that  deliberative 
quality varied across the duration of debate. In both 
committee debates, the quality of deliberation increased 
during the three stages of decision-making process, 
even though the scores differed on the two debates, 
with the situation of decision-making influencing the 
quality  of  deliberation.  Further  large-scaled  studies 
are needed to confirm our findings. Our study demon-
strates the importance of going beyond the comparat-
ive analysis  of  institutional  variables by focusing on 
situational and temporal variables.
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Appendix 1: Qualitative Questionnaire
Topic of debate
First of all, I would like to ask you to give me some more information on (the topic)…
1. Could you please identify the main positions on the topic? 
2. What are the main interests at stake? 
Follow up: What are the main conflicting points?…And the main cleavages?
Role of the political party/political group
I would now like to turn to the role of your political party and your European political group…
3. Usually, political groups aim at agreeing on a common position. Could you please describe the 
opinion-building process in your own political group? 
4. And what about the position of your national party? 
5. Could you please describe the role of your political group in the decision-making process? 
Follow up: What about the role of your national party?
6. Members of the same political groups may disagree with each other on certain topics. Generally 
speaking, how do political groups deal with eventual disagreements? 
7. And in (member state), with the national party? Do people sometimes get 
recommendations/instructions from their party on what position to defend? 
 
8. And on (the topic). Do members of your group agree with each other? What about within your party? 
 
9. What role do lobbyists and interest groups play in the decision-making process? 
Follow up: In general, how influential are they?
 
Publicity
 
10.How is the (topic) perceived in the European public opinion? 
Follow up:…and in your Member State?
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Appendix 2: Discourse Quality Index
Participation
1a—Participation (constraints)
(0) The speaker indicates that he or she is constrained.
(1) The speaker does not indicate that he or she is constrained by the behavior of other participants.
Level of justification
(0) X should be done but no reason is given
(1) reason Y is given why X should or should not be done but no linkage is made 
(2) linkage is made why one should expect that X contributes to or detracts from Y
(3) two complete justifications are given (either for the same demand or for two different demands)
(4) a sophisticated justification is given 
Content of Justification
3a—Common good 
(0) The speaker refers to the interests of their constituents/their country or to sectoral interests.
(1) The speaker does not refer to any interests.
(2) The speaker refers to European or universal interests.
3b—Solidarity
(0) The speaker opposes a proposition important to some people without considering negative consequences 
his position may have for these people.
(1) The speaker defends a certain position without considering negative consequences his position may have for 
other people.
(2) The speaker implicitly considers the interests of all people concerned.
(3) The speaker explicitly considers the interests of different people concerned.
Respect
4a—Respect toward other participants
(0) The speaker personally attacks other participants.
(1) The speaker does not refer or refers in a neutral way to other participants.
(2) The speaker positively refers to other participants. 
4b—Respect toward groups that are to be helped through policies
(0) The speaker makes negative statements about the groups.
(1) The speaker makes no explicitly negative statements; nor does the speaker make explicit positive 
statements about the groups.
(2) The speaker makes at least one explicitly positive statement about the groups.
Interactivity
5a—Reference to other participants
(0) Participants do not refer to other participants.
(1) Participants refer to other participants.
5b—Reference to other participants
(0) Participants do not refer to other participants' arguments.
(1) Participants refer to other participants' arguments but do not discuss them.
(2) Participants refer to other participants' arguments and discuss them.
Constructive politics
(0) The speaker sits on his/her positions. There is no attempt at compromise, reconciliation, or consensus 
building.
(1) The speaker signals willingness to compromise. 
(2) The speaker makes a mediating proposal that does not fit the current agenda but belongs to another 
agenda.
(3) The speaker makes an appeal for consensus or compromise.
(4) The speaker makes a mediating proposal that fits the current agenda.
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Appendix 3: List of Qualitative Interviews
 
1. Two-Pack
Members* of the ECON committee:
1. Interview n°17, 14.02.2012, EP Strasbourg. 
2. Interview n°25, 16.02.2012, EP Brussels. 
3. Interview n°28, 20.02.2012, EP Brussels. 
4. Interview n°36, 06.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
5. Interview n°50, 13.03.2012, EP Strasbourg. 
6. Interview n°51, 14.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
7. Interview n°53, 14.03.2012, EP Strasbourg. 
8. Interview n°52, 14.03.2012, EP Strasbourg. 
9. Interview n°61, 21.03.2012, EP Strasbourg. 
10.Interview n°70, 27.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
EP officials ECON committee: 
1. Interview n°20, 15.02.2012, EP Strasbourg. 
2. Interview n°32, 02.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
3. Interview n°30, 02.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
4. Interview n°38, 06.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
5. Interview n°39, 07.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
6. Interview n°12, 13.03.2012, EP Strasbourg. 
7. Interview n°67, 22.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
8. Interview n°64, 22.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
9. Interview n°65, 22.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
10.Interview n°76, 30.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
2. Victims directive
Members of the LIBE committee:
1. Interview n°23, 26.02.2012, EP Strasbourg. 
2. Interview n°27, 28.02.2012, EP Brussels. 
3. Interview n°43, 08.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
4. Interview n°54, 14.03.2012, EP Strasbourg. 
5. Interview n°71, 27.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
Members of the FEMM committee:
1. Interview n°22, 16.02.2012, EP Strasbourg. 
2. Interview n°35, 06.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
3. Interview n°33, 06.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
4. Interview n°73, 28.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
EP officials LIBE committee:
1. Interview n°29, 10.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
2. Interview n°57, 15.03.2012, EP Strasbourg. 
3. Interview n°66, 22.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
4. Interview n°40, 22.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
5. Interview n°75, 29.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
6. Interview n°21, 15.02. 2012, EP Strasbourg. 
EP officials FEMM committee:
1. Interview n°19, 15.02.2012, EP Brussels. 
2. Interview n°31, 02.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
3. Interview n°34, 06.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
4. Interview n°62, 22.03.2012, EP Brussels. 
5. Interview n°77, 30.03.2012, EP Brussels.
Note: *Interviews were held with rapporteurs,  shadow rapporteurs,  coordinators,  and committee members 
(MEPs), as well as with Members of the Secretariat, group advisors, and MEP assistants (EP officials). The 
article indicates whether the information stems from an MEP or an official, but withholds further information to 
guarantee the anonymity of the interviewees.
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